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• The pandemic of the novel coronavirus
SARS-CoV-2 likely originated from bats
or other wildlife species.
• We propose a conceptual model on
SARS-CoV-2 spillover from infected
humans to naive wildlife hosts in
North America.
• We hypothesize that SARS-CoV-2 is
transmitted via sewage into the natural
aquatic environment where wildlife become infected.
• Wildlife surveillance near waste water
treatment plants would elucidate
whether SARS-CoV-2 has spilled over
into wildlife.
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a b s t r a c t
There is evidence that the current outbreak of the novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, which causes COVID-19, is of
animal origin. As with a number of zoonotic pathogens, there is a risk of spillover into novel hosts. Here, we propose a hypothesized conceptual model that illustrates the mechanism whereby the SARS-CoV-2 could spillover
from infected humans to naive wildlife hosts in North America. This proposed model is premised on transmission
of SARS-CoV-2 from human feces through municipal waste water treatment plants into the natural aquatic environment where potential wildlife hosts become infected. We use the existing literature on human coronaviruses,
including SARS CoV, to support the potential pathways and mechanisms in the conceptual model. Although we
focus on North America, our conceptual model could apply to other parts of the globe as well.
Published by Elsevier B.V.

1. Introduction
As with SARS and MERS, the recent outbreak of a novel coronavirus
(COVID-19) is suspected to have a wildlife origin, with likely ultimate
origins in a bat species and possibly with more proximal origins from
an intermediate animal host (Ji et al., 2020). With the global spread of
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the virus among humans, we are concerned that this novel virus has
the potential to spillover from infected humans to native wildlife that
could subsequently serve as new reservoir hosts for the virus. In this
way, the virus may become entrenched in areas outside of its region
of origin and available for future outbreaks. However, for this to occur
there are a number of hurdles that the virus would need to overcome
to infect a novel wildlife host. Here, we propose a plausible mechanism
where SARS-CoV-2, the pathogen causing the disease COVID-19, could
spillover from infected humans into novel wildlife hosts in North
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America. We developed a conceptual model for this hypothesized
mechanism (Fig. 1), which we outlined as ﬁve premises supported
from the existing literature on shedding of coronaviruses by humans,
survivability of these viruses, and documented pathways for movement
of coronaviruses into the natural environment. Although we focused on
North America, our conceptual model could also be applied to other
parts of the globe.

2. Infected people shed coronavirus in feces
For our conceptual model to be plausible, we assume that
coronaviruses can be shed in the feces of infected humans. This assumption has been supported by research on other coronaviruses
(Yeo et al., 2020). For example, MERS coronavirus was detected in
14.6% and 2.4% of fecal and urine samples, respectively, from 37 infected individuals (Corman et al., 2015), while SARS CoV was shed
in the feces of 56 infected individuals for a median of 27 days,
with 4 individuals shedding for over 100 days (Liu et al., 2004). In
addition, 38.4% of SARS-infected patients experienced diarrhea,
SARS-CoV RNA was detected in 16–73% of the stool samples, and
cultured from the small intestines of 5 patients (Leung et al.,
2003; Yeo et al., 2020). SARS-CoV also remained infectious in diarrheal fecal samples at room temperature for up to 4 days (Lai
et al., 2005). More recently, a U. S. patient with COVID-19 also
shed SARS-CoV-2 RNA in their stool (Holshue et al., 2020) while
SARS-CoV-2 RNA was detected in the feces of 59% of 96 infected patients for up to 31 days (Zheng et al., 2020). Thus, a portion of infected humans are capable of shedding novel coronaviruses,
including SARS-CoV-2, in their feces, with some for extended (1–4 months) periods. Although there is uncertainty whether SARSCoV-2 remains infectious in feces, similar coronaviruses, such as
SARS-CoV, are infectious in feces, and ACE2 receptors for SARSCoV-2, are abundant in gastric, duodenal, and rectal epithelia cells
in humans (Xiao et al., 2020). This, coupled with the positive detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA from feces in a large portion of infected patients (Wu et al., 2020b; Xiao et al., 2020; Zheng et al., 2020)
suggests that infectious SARS-CoV-2 virions are secreted from gastrointestinal cells into feces (Xiao et al., 2020).

3. Coronavirus survives in sewage and can be introduced into waste
water treatment plants
If fecal shedding is substantial in terms of number of infected individuals at focal locations, such as in hospitals, airports, or concentrated
housing, then substantial amounts of virus could be deposited into municipal sewage systems (pathways 1 and 2 in Fig. 1). Human
coronaviruses (HCoV) can survive for extended periods in the environment, especially aqueous environments (Geller et al., 2012). Survival
rates of HCoV in saline ranged from 80 to 100% for 3 days and 30 to
55% for six days (Geller et al., 2012). Using two surrogate HCoVs for
SARS CoV, Casanova et al. (2009) found that the viruses remained infectious in water and sewage for 17–22 days at 25 °C and with b1 log10 reduction in infectivity at 4 °C. In addition, SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been
detected in untreated wastewater and sewage in sufﬁcient quantities
to suggest testing of sewage from municipalities as a viable surveillance
strategy (Ahmed et al., 2020; Medema et al., 2020; Wu et al., 2020a).
This suggests that water and sewage contaminated with SARS-CoV-2
is a potential vehicle for introduction into the environment, given it
can survive the waste water treatment process.
4. Coronavirus survives municipal waste treatment and is introduced into the natural aquatic environment
Once HCoV arrives at waste water treatment plants (WWTP) in sewage (pathway 2 in Fig. 1), it needs to maintain its infectivity through the
treatment process to be of concern in the efﬂuent that is ultimately introduced into the natural environment. In general, the transit time for
sewage to reach a WWTP is less than one day (Wigginton et al.,
2015). While WWTP do reduce virus levels, infective virus is still detected in the efﬂuent from these plants (Wigginton et al., 2015). Based
on metagenomics, coronaviruses were detected in 80% of the samples
from efﬂuent class B sewage sludge from 5 WWTP in the U.S., which is
typically applied to agricultural lands as a soil amendment (Bibby and
Peccia, 2013). Although data is lacking for coronaviruses, wastewater
treatment prior to disinfection results in 0–2 log10 reduction of infective
enteroviruses and 2–N3-log reduction of infective adenoviruses, with
infectious virus still being detected in the ﬁnal efﬂuent from the waste
treatment process released into the environment (Simmons and

Fig. 1. Conceptual model of spillover of novel coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 into new wildlife hosts in North America and subsequent spillback into the human population. Numbered pathways
are described in the text.
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Xagoraraki, 2011; Wigginton et al., 2015). Thus, there is evidence that
infectious coronaviruses could pass through the wastewater treatment
process and enter natural aquatic systems via WWTP (pathway 3 in
Fig. 1).
Even if WWTP completely or mostly eliminated SARS-CoV-2 from
their efﬂuent when they operated efﬁciently, there are numerous opportunities for SARS-CoV-2 to enter the aquatic environment through
periodic accidental spills of untreated waste from WWTPs. There are
two types of WWTP systems in the U.S. Combined sewer systems
(CSS) are the earliest WWTP constructed and collect sewage and
storm water runoff through a single pipe system while sanitary sewer
systems (SSS) are newer and are separate from municipal storm water
systems (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2004). Of the 14,194
WWTP in the U.S., 65.8% are CSS, which are responsible for 850 billion gal
of untreated waste being accidentally released each year; SSS are responsible for 3–10 billion gal of spills each year (U. S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2004). Often, these spills coincide with extreme
events, such as severe storms. For example, 11 billion gal of untreated
(31.3%) and partially treated (68.7%) sewage was released from
WWTP into rivers and canals during Hurricane Sandy, mostly in New
York City and northern New Jersey (Kenward et al., 2013). Both of
these areas are currently experiencing massive COVID-19 outbreaks.
During the current COVID-19 pandemic, there have been large sewage
spills in outbreak areas. For example in February–March 2020, 16.1 million gal of sewage spilled in two separate accidents near Atlanta,
Georgia (Kelly, 2020) and 211 million gal of sewage was released in
multiple accidents near Fort Lauderdale, Florida (Brasileiro, 2020).
Thus, accidental releases of untreated sewage into the environment
are an additional mechanism whereby infectious SARS-CoV-2 could be
released into nearby waterways.
5. Bats and other wildlife become infected with coronavirus by
drinking contaminated water in the natural environment
Although coronaviruses are assumed to lose infectivity in aquatic environments because of their lipid envelopes, the time for these viruses
to reach 90% inactivation (T90) varies considerably, depending on strain,
medium characteristics, and temperature (Wigginton et al., 2015). For
example, a swine coronavirus has a T90 of 4 days at 25 °C and 24 days
at 4 °C in wastewater (Casanova et al., 2009) while HCoV can survive
up to 588 days in ﬁltered tap water at 4 °C (Gundy et al., 2009).
While, in some circumstances, coronaviruses released into natural bodies of water may become too dilute for uptake by wildlife, there are two
mechanisms where dilution of coronavirus would be minimized. The
ﬁrst are if efﬂuent from WWTP is released into a relatively small body
of water. For example, one of the WWTP in Fort Collins, Colorado releases its efﬂuent into a slow moving, 8 m-wide irrigation canal that is
adjacent to a natural area. In addition, Medema et al. (2020) and Wu
et al. (2020a) found high titers of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in sewage at
WWTP in both the Netherlands and North America. While not deﬁnitive, their results suggest that SARS-CoV-2 is measurable in waste
water. A second mechanism is possible bioaccumulation of
coronaviruses by molluscs and other aquatic organisms. For example;
clams have been found to bioaccumulate avian inﬂuenza viruses from
the surrounding water (Huyvaert et al., 2012).
Once released into natural aquatic systems, coronaviruses would be
available for uptake in wildlife hosts (pathway 4 in Fig. 1). Insectivorous
bats (order Chiroptera) are the logical reservoir host for COVID-19 in
North America because they were considered the reservoir host for
SARS CoV (Banerjee et al., 2019) and are suspected as a host, such as
Rhinolophus spp., for SARS-CoV-2 (Lu et al., 2020). In addition,
coronaviruses have been detected in feces of North American bats
with viral RNA prevalence in shed feces of 17–50%, depending on the
species of bat (Dominguez et al., 2007). Other North American wildlife
strongly associated with aquatic environments are raccoons (Procyon
lotor), which have also been infected with coronaviruses (Martin and
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Zeidner, 1992). Interestingly, raccoons also feed on aquatic organisms,
such as mollusks, that are also potential candidates to bioaccumulate viruses. Based on experimental infections of domestic animals with SARSCoV-2 (Shi et al., 2020), other wildlife species that may function as wildlife hosts are cats (Felidae) and members of the family Mustelidae
(e.g., weasels, skunks, otters, mink, etc.). Examples of mustelids associated with aquatic systems in North America are river otters (Lontra
canadensis) and American mink (Neovison vison), which may react similarly to SARS-CoV-2 as the domestic ferrets used in Shi et al. (2020).
However, bats remain the most likely species where spillover of
SARS-CoV-2 might occur. Bats drink directly from natural water sources,
such as lakes, ponds and slow-ﬂowing streams and rivers, by swooping
over the water sources and lapping at the surface (Korine et al., 2016).
For some species, use of natural body waters was inﬂuenced by proximity to WWTP, where they increased their foraging activity downstream
from WWTP relative to upstream (Vaughan et al., 1996; Abbott et al.,
2009). This suggests a potential pathway for bats to become infected
with HCoV, and presumably SARS-CoV-2, from water sources contaminated with these pathogens from WWTP.
6. Coronavirus spills back from new wildlife hosts to humans
An important consideration in whether SARS-CoV-2 becomes
entrenched in North America through a wildlife host is whether
spillback from wildlife hosts to humans could occur (pathway 5 in
Fig. 1). Spillover into wildlife and subsequent spillback into the human
population represents an unmanaged source of SARS-CoV-2. For example, if bats are considered the likely reservoir host for COVID-19,
spillback of coronaviruses in North America could occur where bats
use buildings for nocturnal roosts or hibernation sites and deposit
their feces where humans might encounter them, such as in attics of
residences (Voigt et al., 2016). North American bats have been shown
to shed coronaviruses in their feces, often at high (up to 50%) prevalence
(Dominguez et al., 2007). Airborne transmission of SARS CoV from
human fecal matter was considered the primary route of infection of
187 human cases in a housing complex (Yu et al., 2004), indicating
that aerosol transmission of HCoV from bat feces to humans is possible.
Although there is still considerable uncertainty about which wildlife
species can serve as reservoir hosts for SARS-CoV-2, current research on
domestic animals indicates potential candidates in wild cats and
mustelids (Shi et al., 2020). Because domestic cats can efﬁciently replicate SARS-CoV-2 and transmit the virus to naïve cats (Shi et al., 2020),
domestic cats represent another mechanism for spillover transmission
from wild cats to humans. Another risk associated with the establishment of SARS-CoV-2 in a wildlife host population is the potential for
mutation in novel hosts that results in a variant virus (Menachery
et al., 2017). Of particular concern, is whether there is the potential for
recombination of SARS-CoV-2 with other bat coronaviruses should spillover of SARS-CoV-2 occur in bat populations.
7. Conclusions
While the primary risk associated with the current COVID-19 outbreak appears to be human-to-human transmission of SARS-CoV-2,
we believe the existing evidence also supports the plausibility of novel
coronaviruses, such as SARS-CoV-2, spilling over to new wildlife hosts
through fecal shedding by infected humans and introduction to the natural aquatic environment via the waste water treatment system. In addition, we posit that spillback of novel coronaviruses from the new
wildlife hosts is also possible. Thus, considering the current COVID-19
pandemic, wastewater treatment plants and their surrounding environments should come under increased scrutiny for serving as potential
areas where spillover into wildlife hosts could occur. This was recently
conducted in the Netherlands where SARS-CoV-2 RNA was found in
sewage from WWTPs servicing 6 cities and an airport (Medema et al.,
2020). Such scrutiny could integrate surveillance of key wildlife species,
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such as bats and raccoons, which have the potential for acquiring
coronaviruses from their aquatic environments. An enhanced surveillance program of identifying SARS-CoV-2 spillover into wildlife would
ideally involve 1) identifying “hotspot” municipalities with high
human caseloads of COVID-19, 2) identifying areas downstream from
WWTP efﬂuent releases, and 3) sampling target wildlife species, such
as bats, mustelids, and raccoons, for SARS-CoV-2 antibodies and viral
presence. Such an effort could be conducted in conjunction with sampling WWTP efﬂuent as proposed by Medema et al. (2020).
At this stage, a probabilistic risk assessment model would probably
not be very informative because of the uncertainties of the mechanisms
described here and the need to parameterize the pathways we propose.
For example, most detection of coronavirus in fecal and environmental
samples have focused on RNA detection through PCR and has, generally,
not documented infectivity. We argue that further research into our
proposed pathways is warranted, especially because outbreaks of
novel, zoonotic pathogens have epidemiological implications beyond
just human-to-human transmission.
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